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Implied Fortitude: California's Defense of Duress
I. INTRODUCTION
This article will examine the development and present require-
ments of the defense of duress in California. When one person
threatens another with immediate injury if that person does not
commit a certain crime, the person acting pursuant to the threat
is said to be acting under duress. The defense of duress is not a
recent development of the law' but has been recognized since an-
tiquity as an excuse for conduct which would otherwise be crimi-
nal, providing that the particular requirements of the forum
jurisdiction have been met.2 Lord Bacon, an early proponent of
the defense of duress, felt that when an actor was put in the situ-
ation of having to make a choice between two evils, that circum-
stance should carry a privilege in itself.3
The underlying principle supporting the defense of duress is
that criminal liability must not be visited on the blameless. If a
person commits an act under the duress of threatened violence,
"responsibility for the act cannot be ascribed to him, since in ef-
fect, it was not his own desire, or motivation, or will, which led to
1. 2 J. STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 105 (1883).
2. L. Newman & L. Weitzer, Duress, Free Will, and the Criminal Law, 30 S.
CAL. L. REV. 313, 314 (1957) [Hereinafter cited as Newman & Weitzer].
If "duress" was to excuse it had to be shown that the compulsion was in
its nature such as would induce a well grounded apprehension of death or
serious bodily harm. The compulsion had to arise without the negligence
or fault of the person claiming aid from the doctrine, and the compulsion
had to be instant, present, imminent and impending. The force com-
plained of by the victim must have lasted during the whole time required
for the performance of the criminal act. The "duressed" had to show
resistance to the point of death (or at least to the instant of serious and
grievous bodily harm) before he capitulated and acted. The force had to
be exerted, if not on the victim, then on someone close to the victim, such
as a wife or child. The "duressed" had to avail himself of any opportunity
to avoid or escape from the force.
3. The law chargeth no man with default where the act is compulsory
and not voluntary, and where there is not a consent and election: and
therefore, if either there be an impossibility for a man to do otherwise, or
so great a perturbation of the judgment and reason as in presumption of
law man's nature cannot overcome, such necessity carrieth a privilege in
itself.
LORD FRANcIS BACON, THE WORKS OF FRANcIs BACON 343 (Shedding, Ellis & Heath
1859).
the act."4 Clearly, when an actor commits a crime through fear of
death or serious bodily injury, he cannot be said to be acting of
his own volition. In fact, he is very probably acting in a manner
completely contrary to that dictated by his own free will. As a re-
cent Michigan Court explained, "(a) successful duress defense
excuses the defendant from criminal responsibility for an other-
wise criminal act because the defendant was compelled to commit
the act: the compulsion or duress overcomes the defendant's free
will and his actions lack the required mens rea."5
The development of duress is, no doubt, a judicial concession to
human frailty. It incorporates a degree of flexibility into the
otherwise strict requirements of the law. Generally speaking, the
court must balance the severity of the threatened force with the
gravity of the crime subsequently committed. By way of illustra-
tion, if a defendant alleges he was forced to commit the crime of
shoplifting because another person threatened to break his arm if
he did not comply, most American juries would probably excuse
his actions. On the other hand, if the crime subsequently commit-
ted was rape or murder, it is doubtful. that any jury would excuse
the defendant. In order to effectuate the defense of duress, it is
necessary to determine the requisite degree of threatened force
that would excuse a particular crime.
Modernly, it has become an accepted legal principle that an act,
which would otherwise constitute a crime, should be excused if
done under duress that was present, imminent, and impending,
and of a nature to induce a well-grounded apprehension of death
or serious bodily injury if the act is not performed.6 Whether the
defendant acted in fear of immediate serious bodily injury has
been considered the relevant criteria in a wide variety of situa-
tions. A sampling of the charges in which the defense of duress
under threat of serious bodily injury has been raised would in-
4. Newman & Weitzer, supra note 2, at 313.
5. People v. Luther, 394 Mich. 619, 622, 232 N.W.2d 184, 186 (1975). In this case,
defendant, a minimum security prison inmate, was confronted in the prison lava-
tory by six assailants who made homosexual demands of him. When defendant
refused, he was beaten and threatened with a knife, and chased off the prison
grounds. The Supreme Court of Michigan upheld the defendant's right to assert
the defense of duress to the charge of prison escape.
6. 1 R. ANDERSON, WHARTONS CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE § 123, at 262
(1957); 1 H. BRIL, CYCLOPEDIA OF CRIMINAL LAW §166, at 306 (1922); W. CLARK & W.
MARSHALL, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CRrMEs 359 (7th ed. 1967); J. HALL, GENERAL
PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 443 (2nd ed. 1960); S. KADisH & M. PAULISON, CRIMI-
NAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES 545 (2nd ed. 1969) (Hereinafter cited as KADISH &
PAULISON); W. LA FAVE & A. ScoTr, CRIMINAL LAW §49, at 379 (1972); J. MILLER,
CRIMINAL LAW 164-165 (1934); R. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE 537 (3rd
ed. 1966); 1 F. WHARTON, WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAW §384, at 514-515 (12th ed. J.
Ruppenthal 1932); 1 B. WrrKmn, CALIFORNIA CRIES §156, at 149 (1964).
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clude the sale of drugs,7 being in the country illegally,8 perjury,9
forgery,'0 being on a public road while intoxicated,l' attempted
robbery,12 escape,13 armed robbery,14 rape,15 receiving stolen
7. United States v. McClain, 531 F. 2d 431, 438 (9th Cir. 1976). Defendant al-
leged that a third person had coerced him into handling cocaine by beating him
until he agreed to cooperate. The court applied the serious bodily injury test, but
denied the applicability of the defense because defendant failed to establish that
there was no reasonable opportunity to escape. See also United States v. Gordon,
526 F. 2d 406, 407 (9th Cir. 1975).
8. United States v. Palmer, 458 F. 2d 663, 665 (9th Cir. 1972). The defendant in
this case contended that he entered the country illegally to give a deposition in a
civil suit in order to avoid "financial ruin." The court held that in order for duress
to provide a defense, it must induce a well founded fear of immediate great bodily
harm or death. Fear of "financial ruin" was insufficient.
9. United States v. Mickels, 502 F. 2d 1173, 1177 (7th Cir. 1974). Defendant
police officer alleged that his grand jury testimony, which subsequently resulted
in his conviction for perjury, should be surpressed because it was given under the
duress of an unconstitutional police department rule prohibiting officers from re-
fusing to give evidence before the grand jury. The court stated that it would follow
the common law rule, which required, at a minimum, that the defendant feared
serious bodily injury.
10. United States v. Birch, 470 F. 2d 808, 812 (4th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411
U.S. 931 (1972). In this case the defendant was a civilian employee of the U.S. De-
fense Department stationed in Germany. Both he and his wife were convicted in
Germany of mistreating their servant and sentenced to prison. The defendant ob-
tained forged identity cards and both he and his wife fled Germany to return to
the United States. The defendant alleged concern over the judgment of the Ger-
man Court as the reason for committing forgery. The court, however, held the de-
fendant had failed to establish an apprehension of serious bodily harm.
11. Haywood v. State, 43 Ala. App. 358, 361, 190 So. 2d 725, 727 (1966) cert.
denied, 280 Ala. 171, 190 So. 2d 728 (1966). Defendant was a passenger in an auto-
mobile involved in a collision. After the collision, defendant left the car in which
he was seated and stepped out on the highway obviously intoxicated. The follow-
ing jury charge was upheld by the Supreme Court of Alabama: "(I)f you believe
from the evidence that the defendant honestly believed he was in danger of bodily
harm if he stayed in his automobile at the scene of the accident, then I charge you
he had a right to remove himself to a place of safety."
12. Koontz v. State, 204 So. 2d 224, 226 (Fla. Ct. App. 1967). In this case, de-
fendant Koontz freely admitted using a shotgun in an attempt to rob a service sta-
tion attendant. However, Koontz contended his criminal actions were compelled
by threats against himself and members of his family. The trial court refused to
instruct the jury that an otherwise criminal act could be excused if it was commit-
ted pursuant to an apprehension of death or serious bodily harm. The Florida Dis-
trict Court of Appeals subsequently reversed the conviction for failure to give the
instruction. See also Hood v. State, 313 N.E. 2d 546, 547 (Ind. App. 3rd Dist. 1974).
13. People v. Lovercamp, 43 Cal. App. 3d 823, 832, 118 Cal. Rptr. 110, 115 (1975).
In a novel opinion by Presiding Justice Gardner, Fourth District Court of Appeal,
a new inroad was created in California's recognition of the defense of necessity.
The case itself involved two women inmates who had been threatened continu-
ously by a group of lesbian inmates who told them to "fuck or fight". After one
fight and numerous threats, the women escaped the institution and were promptly
captured. The defendant wisely asserted the defense of necessity, rather than du-
ress, because California requires a threat of immediate death to establish duress.
property, 16 and murder.17
Despite general acceptance by legal commentators that an indi-
vidual can be compelled to commit a crime by a threat of serious
bodily injury, California, by statute, requires that the defendant
must have believed that immediate death would follow if the
crime was not performed as requested, in order for the affirmative
defense of duress to be viable.18 California does not consider
threats which are less serious than immediate death to be suffi-
ciently grievous to excuse any criminal conduct, however trivial
the offenses are in light of the threatened injury sought to be
avoided by the defendant. California also considers mere threats
of death or serious bodily injury to one's family as insufficient to
excuse any criminal conduct. Moreover, the jury may be entirely
precluded from even considering that any threats had ever been
CAL. PENAL CODE §26 (7). The assertion of necessity was unusual because it is
generally applied only when the choice of evils was created by forces of nature
rather than by other individuals. The major drawback of necessity, as opposed to
duress, is that it requires the defendant to prove his defense by a preponderance
of the evidence. People v. Condley, 69 Cal. App. 3d 999, 1014, 138 Cal. Rptr. 515, 522
(1977). Duress merely requires raising a reasonable doubt. People v. Graham, 57
Cal. App. 3d 238, 240, 129 Cal. Rptr. 31, 32 (1976). Justice Gardner enunciated sev-
eral factors which must be alleged before the defense of necessity is applicable to
a prison escape. The most relevant factor provides that the prisoner must be
"faced with a specific threat of death, forcible sexual attack or substantial bodily
injury in the immediate future." See also D. Maraghy, Availability of the Defense
of Duress in Prison Escapes: People v. Lovercamp, 12 WAKE FOREST L.R. 1102
(1976); People v. Harmon, 53 Mich. App. 482, 486, 220 N.W. 2d 212, 214 (1974).
14. People v. Adcock, 29 Ill. App. 3d 917, 920, 331 N.E.2d 573, 576 (1975). The
defendant contended that his participation in art armed robbery was compelled by
threats of violence from a co-participant in the robbery. The Appellate Court of
Illinois reversed defendant's conviction for the trial court's failure to instruct the
jury that a person is not guilty of a punishable offense if his otherwise criminal
conduct was performed pursuant to a threat of ,death or great bodily harm.
15. People v. Patton, 25 IM. App. 3d 840, 844, 322 N.E. 2d 592, 595 (1975). In this
case the defendant appealed from his conviction for rape, contending he was de-
prived of competent representation by counsel because of his counsel's failure to
request an instruction on the defense of duress. The court held that counsel's fail-
ure to tender the instruction did not result in prejudice because "the defense of
compulsion is not applicable in a situation in which there was no apprehension of
death or serious bodily harm."
16. Robinson v. State, 141 Tex. Crim. 380, 386, 148 S.W. 2d 1115, 1118 (1941). The
court held that if a defendant was put in fear of death or serious bodily injury,
and, while laboring under such fear assisted in concealing stolen goods, he is not
liable to punishment for his act.
17. Wentworth v. State, 29 Md. App. 110, 121, 249 A. 2d 421, 428 (1975). "(A)n
'imperfect' defense of duress may not exculpate a defendant in an unlawful homi-
cide case but may supply that mitigation necessary to lower the degree of guilt
from murder to manslaughter.. ." Id. at 490.
18. CAL. PENAL CODE §26 (7) (West Supp. 1977).
All persons are capable of committing crimes except those belonging to
the following classes: Seven .... Persons (unless the crime be punishable
with death) who committed the act or made the omission charged under
threats or menaces sufficient to show that they had reasonable cause to
and did believe their lives would be endangered if they refused.
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made.19
II. THE FORMATION OF STANDARDS
A. Relevant Considerations
Like California, the majority of states have statutorily provided
for the defense of duress. 20 In drafting such a statute, initially it
is necessary for the legislature to consider whether values are ab-
solute or relative and to what extent an acceptable end may jus-
tify an otherwise offensive means. If the legislature makes the
preliminary determination that values are relative, and that in
certain circumstances an otherwise offensive means may justify
an acceptable end, some type of standard is then necessary to de-
termine the degree of threatened force which will excuse other-
wise criminal conduct.
Since any member of society could find themselves in a situa-
tion in which they are compelled by threatened violence to com-
mit an unlawful act, the standard must be drawn in light of the
19. People v. Richards, 269 Cal. App. 2d 768, 75 Cal. Rptr. 597 (1969). At trial,
the defendant offered testimony to establish that his escape from prison was
caused by the threats of other inmates to force the defendant to submit to sod-
omy. The prosecution's objection to the testimony was sustained. Defendant
thereupon rested without presenting further evidence. The First District Court of
Appeal upheld defendant's conviction on questionable reasoning, stating that it
was necessary for the threat to be "accompanied by a direct or implied request
that the actor commit the criminal act. In this case there was no offer to show that
anyone demanded or requested that the defendant escape." The court concluded
with the dreadful note, "(H)e (defendant) was given alternative courses of action.
The submission to sodomy, abhorrent as it may be, falls short of loss of life." See
also R. Berger, Escape From Prison-Defenses--Duress--Homosexual Attacks, 8
AKRON L.R. 352, 357 (1974-75); M.R. Gardner, The Defense of Necessity and the
Right to Escape from Prison-A Step Towards Incarceration Free from Sexual
Assault, 49 S. CAL. L REV. 110, 127 (1975-76); J.T. Griffith, Duress is a Defense to a
Prison Escape, 43 UNiv. CuN. L REV. 956, 959 (1974).
20. Aaiz. REV. STAT. §13-134 (West 1956); ARK. STAT. ANN. §41-208 (1977); COLO.
REV. STAT. §18-1-708 (1973); CONN. GEN. STAT. A-N. §53a-14 (West 1958); DEL. CODE
tit. 11, §431 (1974); GA. CODE ANN. §26-906 (1977); HAW. REV. STAT. §703-301 (1976);
IDAHO CODE §18-201 (Supp. 1978); Ky. REV. STAT. §501.090 (1969); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. §14:18 (West 1974); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. §94-201 (1969); NEV. REV. STAT.
§194.010 (1965); N. H. REV. STAT. ANN. §626:1 (1974); N. M. STAT. ANN. §21-1-1 (Rule
8 (c)) (Supp. 1975); N. Y. PENAL LAW §40.00 (McKinney 1975); N. D. CENT. CODE
§12.1-05-10 (1976); OKLA. STAT. ANN., tit.21, §156 (West 1958); OR. REV. STAT.
§161.270 (1976); PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 18, §309 (Purdon 1959); S. D. COMPILED LAWS
ANN. §§22-5-1, 22-5-2 (1967); TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. tit.2, §8.05 (Vernon 1974); UTAH
CODE ANN. §76-2-301 (1977); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §9A.16.060 (1977); Wis. STAT.
ANN. §939.46 (West 1958). It should be noted that, of the above statutory provi-
sions for duress, only Arizona, Idaho and Montana require the defendant fear ac-
tual death in order to invoke the defense of duress.
average citizen. "A law which punished conduct which would not
be blameworthy to the average member of the community would
be too severe for that community to bear."21 The standard must
necessarily allow for consideration of mankind's natural infirmi-
ties. The average citizen is not a hero who will predictably stand
fast in the face of danger. If this were the case, mankind would
not hold heroes in such high esteem. It is more likely that the av-
erage citizen is deeply ingrained with an instinctual desire for
self-preservation. As the Alabama Appellate Court succinctly
noted in Browning v. State, "Upon the question of self-preserva-
tion, even a dumb animal is thus imbued." 22
Allowances must also be made for the varying influences capa-
ble of usurping an individual's free will. Threats of death, threats
of serious bodily injury, threats to one's family, reputation, or
property, are all capable of influencing an individual's freedom of
choice. The suddenness with which these situations may arise
can also affect an individual's freedom of choice. A person faced
suddenly and inescapably with threatened violence may react in
an entirely different manner than they would have, had they had
the opportunity to objectively contemplate their predicament.
Despite the many influences which may affect the exercise of
an individual's free will, the preservation of society requires a cer-
tain amount of responsibility and fortitude from each of its mem-
bers. Each citizen should be expected to possess a threshold of
resistance capable of withstanding idle or trivial threats. This re-
sponsibility of resistance must necessarily be incorporated into
any standard used to determine whether a defendant acted in a
reasonable manner under circumstances coercing a choice be-
tween two evils.23 This presumed strength of character permits
the availability of the defense of duress only to those who protect
an interest that is greater than the harm caused.24 As Sanford
Kadish and Monrad Paulison wrote in considering the responsi-
bility of resistance each citizen is presumed to possess: "To make
liability depend upon the fortitude of any given actor would be no
less impractical or otherwise impolitic than to permit it to depend
upon such other variables as intelligence or clarity of judgment,
21. 0. HoLMES, THE COMMON LAw 50 (1938).
22. 31 Ala. App. 137, 138, 13 So. 2d 54, 56 (1943).
23. Note, Justification and Excuse in the Judaic and Common Law: The Excul-
pation of a Defendant Charged with Homicide, 52 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 599 (1977). "Un-
less a person's conduct causes more benefit than harm,... justification analysis
denies the accused the benefit of the defense. The public interest remains the un-
derlying determinant, and the mode of analysis still a balancing of benefit against
harm." Id. at 610.
24. G.P. Fletcher, The Individualization of Excusing Conditions, 47 S. CAL. L
REv. 1269, 1289 (1974).
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suggestibility or moral insight."25
B. The use of a Balancing Standard vs. a Fixed Standard
After giving consideration to the human frailties of the average
citizen for whom a standard must be tailored, it then becomes
necessary to formulate the mechanics by which that standard is
to be applied. Two distinct methods for determining whether
criminal conduct occasioned by threats of violence should be ex-
cused present themselves. The first method, which I will refer to
as the "balancing standard," would allow the trier of fact to con-
sider, on a case-by-case basis, the threats which were made to the
defendant. The judge should inform the jurors of the responsibil-
ity of each member of society to resist being compelled to commit
a crime along with any other requirements which may be neces-
sary for a valid showing of duress. In determining whether the
defendant has sufficiently resisted such coercion, it may be provi-
dent to require that the harm sought to be avoided was greater
than that caused by defendant's criminal conduct.
The balancing standard appears consistent with the thought
process of the average citizen when suddenly compelled by
threatened violence to commit an unlawful act. The balancing
standard would necessarily take into consideration threats of seri-
ous bodily injury when the threatened harm avoided was greater
than that subsequently caused by defendant's conduct. Allowing
the jury to determine the culpability of defendant's conduct using
the criteria of "reasonableness under the circumstances," builds
into the determination allowances for mankind's infirmities and
tailors the standard to the character of the average citizen.
A second method for determining whether the defendant's
criminal conduct occasioned by threats of violence should be ex-
cused would be to establish a predetermined degree of force nec-
essary to pardon any criminal conduct. For the purposes of this
discussion, I will refer to this method for determining culpability
as the "fixed standard". If the fixed standard is to be used, it is up
to the legislature to determine the particular degree of threatened
force which will be necessary for the defendant to establish du-
ress. Unless the defendant shows that the predetermined degree
of force was exerted against him, he may not use duress as a de-
fense for any subsequent conduct. The obvious disadvantage of
25. KADISH & PAULISON, supra note 6, at 542.
the fixed standard is that the designated degree of threatened
force must be set very high in order to avoid anomolous results.
If the requisite degree of force is not substantial, the defendant
may be permitted to claim duress when the harm he caused was
greater than the threatened violence.
III. DURESS IN CALIFORNIA
A. Present Requirements
Nearly a century ago, the California Legislature chose to adopt
the fixed standard as the proper method for determining whether
the defendant's criminal conduct occasioned by threats should be
excused.26 That statute, which has remained virtually unchanged
since before the turn of the century, requires that the defendant
fear immediate death before he can be excused for any criminal
conduct. California's requirements for the defense of duress have
been best enunciated by the California District Court of Appeals
in the 1927 decision of People v. Sanders,
In order for duress or fear produced by threats or menace to be a valid,
legal excuse for doing anything, which otherwise would be criminal, the
act must have been done under such threats or menaces as show that the
life of the person threatened or menaced was in danger, or that there was
reasonable cause to believe and actual belief that there was such danger.
The danger must not be one of future violence, but of present and immedi-
ate violence at the time of the commission of the forbidden act. The dan-
ger of death at some future time in the absence of danger of death at the
time of the commission of the offense will not excuse. A person who aids
and assists in the commission of the crime, or who commits a crime, is not
relieved from criminality on account of fears excited by threats or
menaces unless the danger be to life, nor unless that danger be present and
immediate.2
7
Thus, threats of dismemberment, disfiguration, severe brutality,
or threats to one's spouse or children will not excuse a defendant
from criminal liability in California. Perhaps the best that can be
said for California's statute is that it is an easy standard to apply.
If the defendant does not prove that he was threatened with im-
mediate death, the defense is simply not available.
B. The Serious Bodily Injury Test As Applied To Accomplices
The stringent requirements of California's fixed standard have
been lessened somewhat in a limited line of cases concerning ac-
complices.28 This parallel line of cases has established that a
showing that the defendant consented to the commission of cer-
26. CAL. PENAL CODE §26 (7), supra note 18.
27. People v. Sanders, 82 Cal. App. 778, 785, 256 P. 251, 254 (1927) (Emphasis
added).
28. As one court noted, "The cases in this state have greatly broadened the sit-
uation under which a person participating in the forbidden acts under threats of
(Vol. 6: 171, 1978] Implied Fortitude
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tain sex acts because of threats of serious bodily injury is suffi-
cient to remove him from the status of an accomplice.
Application of a serious bodily injury test was necessary because
a conviction could not be obtained upon the testimony of an ac-
complice unless it was corroborated. 29 California Penal Code sec-
tion 1111 defines an accomplice as one who is liable to prosecution
for the identical offense charged against the defendant on trial.
The situation giving rise to the application of the serious bodily
injury test occurs when the complaining witness alleges that he
or she has been forced by the defendant to participate in a crimi-
nal sex act, and the defendant in turn, argues that the com-
plaining witness' testimony cannot convict him because such
witness "consented" to the act and was thus an accomplice under
Penal Code section 1111.30 If the strict requirements for excusing
a criminal act under Penal Code section 26(7) were applied, the
complaining witness would be required to show that he or she
feared immediate death in order to remove themselves from the
status of an accomplice. However, the fact that a person could be
compelled to submit to sex acts by threats of violence less serious
than death was given judicial recognition at an early date. 31 With-
out this judicial legislation, the complaining witness' testimony
would have still required corroboration if the threats were only to
do serious bodily injury.
C. The Otis Decision
The argument in support of the recognition that a person can be
forced to commit a criminal act by threats of harm less serious
than immediate death is compelling. In 1959, Justice Tobriner,
then of the First District Court of Appeal, considered the issue of
whether fear of serious bodily injury would suffice as an excuse in
great bodily harm should not be considered an accomplice." People v. Anderson,
264 Cal. App. 2d 271, 274, 70 Cal. Rptr. 231, 233 (1968) (Emphasis added).
29. CAL. PENAL CODE §1111 (West 1970).
A conviction cannot be had upon the testimony of an accomplice unless it
be corroborated by such other evidence as shall tend to connect the de-
fendant with the commission of the offense; and the corroboration is not
sufficient if it merely shows the commission of the offense or the circum-
stances thereof. An accomplice is hereby defined as one who is liable to
prosecution for the identical offense charged against the defendant at trial
in the cause in which the testimony of the accomplice is given.
30. J. Lesser, Duress and the Prison Escape: A New Use for an Old Defense, 45
S. CAL. L. REV. 1062, 1067 (1972).
31. People v. Miller, 66 Cal. 468, 469, 6 P. 99 (1885).
place of the fear of death requirement.32 Consideration of the is-
sue was by way of dicta because, in that case, the defense would
have lacked the necessary element of immediacy. Justice Tobri-
ner's opinion, consistent with the majority of legal commentators,
was that the fine distinction between the two types of fear had be-
come unrealistic in the light of recent psychological research. 33
Justice Tobriner reasoned that if duress frustrated or dominated
willed action, it should affect and, sometimes, even excuse the le-
gal consequences of acts which would otherwise be criminal. Par-
ticular emphasis was given to the modern discernment of the
psychological factors of duress, which at least throw some doubt
on the extreme niceties of the legal distinction between fear of se-
rious bodily harm and fear of life itself. Justice Tobriner recog-
nized, at least with respect to certain sexual violations, that an
actor cannot voluntarily participate in the common intent and
purpose with which the principal perpetrator commits a crime, if
he or she merely consents to the act because of threats of serious
bodily harm.34
IV. THE MODEL PENAL CODE
Contemporaneous with the Otis decision, the American Law In-
stitute considered whether fear of serious bodily injury was suffi-
cient to excuse criminal conduct. In 1960, Tentative Draft No. 10
of the Model Penal Code was published by the Institute. Section
2.09 of this draft, entitled Duress as a Defense, provides that an af-
firmative defense can be established if the actor engages in the
conduct charged because of threats of unlawful force against his
person or the person of another, which a person of reasonable
firmness in the same situation would have been unable to resist.3 5
The availability of the duress defense, however, is precluded
where the defendant recklessly placed himself in a situation in
which it was probable that he would be subjected to duress. The
defense is also unavailable to a defendant who was negligent in
placing himself in such a situation whenever negligence is suffi-
cient to establish culpability.3 6
32. People v. Otis, 174 Cal. App. 2d 119, 344 P.2d 342 (1959).
33. Id.
34. It should be noted that to allow threats of serious bodily injury as an ex-
cuse for otherwise criminal conduct will not produce a class of crimes for which no
one can be held accountable. Penal Code §31 provides in part, "All persons con-
cerned in the commission of a crime, whether it be felony or misdemeanor, and
whether they directly commit the act constituting the offense, or ... by threats,
menaces, command, or coercion, compel another to commit any crime, are princi-
pals in any crime so committed." CAL. PENAL CODE §31 (West 1970).
35. MODEL PENAL CODE §2.09 (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1960).
36. MODEL PENAL CODE §2.09 (Proposed Official Draft, 1962).
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The Model Penal Code also provides a corollary defense for sit-
uations of necessity created by acts of nature. Section 3.02 of the
Model Penal Code, entitled Justification Generally: Choice of
Evils, provides that conduct which the actor believes to be neces-
sary to avoid a harm or evil to himself or to another is justifiable
when that harm or evil is greater than that sought to be prevented
by the law defining the offense charged.37 Like section 2.09, sec-
tion 3.02 is not available to a defendant who has recklessly placed
himself in the situation requiring a choice of evils. Additionally,
the section requires that the issue of competing values must not
have been foreclosed by a deliberate leglislative choice. The gen-
eral defense of necessity provided by section 3.02 is applicable
when the situation requiring a choice of evils is caused by an act
of nature, a non-volitional act. Section 2.09 is a more specific de-
fense and applies when the choice of evils is precipitated by the
threatened action of another person. However, section 2.09
specifically provides that it does not preclude the corollary de-
fense of necessity when the conduct of the actor would otherwise
be justifiable under section 3.02.
The Model Penal Code is based on the supposition that culpa-
bility is essential to the rationality and justice of all penal prohibi-
tions.3 8 In determining to what extent duress should exculpate
conduct which is otherwise criminal, the American Law Institute
chose the test of whether a person of reasonable firmness in the
same situation would have been able to resist the threatened
force. In formulating this criteria, the Institute relied in part on
an article written by Henry Hart.3 9 In essence, Mr. Hart believed
that the obligation of responsible conduct required of each mem-
ber of society must be an obligation which normal members of
the community would be able to comply with. According to the
test of section 2.09, matters of individual temperament should not
be considered in determining whether the defendant acted in a
reasonable manner under the circumstances. However, the re-
sponsibility to resist coercive forces cannot exceed that which the
average member of the community could be expected to meet.
In this respect, the responsibility to resist threatened force ex-
pected by the Model Penal Code differs substantially from the re-
37. MODEL PENAL CODE §3.02 (Proposed Official Draft, 1962).
38. MODEL PENAL CODE §3.02, Comment (Tent. Draft No. 8, 1958).
39. H. Hart, The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAW & CoNrTEmp. PEOB. 401, 414
(1958).
quirement of resistance expected of citizens of California.
According to the Model Penal Code, an individual is expected to
act in a reasonable manner under the circumstances, as deter-
mined by the trier of fact.40 However, in California, an individual
is expected to resist even non-serious criminal conduct unless
death is imminent. California requires the individual to resist
threatened force to the point of death, even though the average
member of the community would probably not do so.4 1 This is
particularly obvious when the subsequent criminal conduct of the
defendant is insignificant. In requiring a standard of conduct
which its average citizen could not comply with, California is nec-
essarily invoking penal prohibitions where moral culpability may
not exist.
Unlike California's fixed standard, the Model Penal Code has
adopted the balancing standard for determining the requisite de-
gree of threatened force necessary to establish the defense of du-
ress. Using the balancing standard, the trier of fact is permitted
to determine the culpability of defendant's otherwise criminal
conduct in light of the severity of the threatened violence. 42
Whether otherwise criminal conduct will be excused depends
upon whether a person of reasonable firmness in the same situa-
tion would have been able to resist the threats. 4 3 The balancing
standard necessarily allows consideration of threats of serious
bodily injury made to the defendant. However, due to a citizen's
implied responsibility to resist the commission of a crime, the
threatened serious bodily injury should be greater than the crime
subsequently committed.
Although threats to property or reputation would not be suffi-
cient to establish the defense of duress under the requirements of
the Model Penal Code, the necessary showing is still considerably
less than California's requirement that the defendant fear imme-
diate death." The American Law Institute found no valid reason
for limiting the coercive threats necessary to excuse otherwise
criminal conduct to threats of death, or even serious bodily injury.
Thus, threats of minor injury would be sufficient when the crimi-
nal conduct was de minimus. 45 The Institute further believed that
the imperiled victim need not be the actor, nor need the injury
portended be immediate.4 6 Institute members felt it sufficient
40. MODEL PENAL CODE §2.09, note 35 supra.
41. CAL. PENAL CODE §26 (7), note 18 supra.
42. MODEL PENAL CODE §2.09, note 35 supra.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. MODEL PENAL CODE §2.09, Comment (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1960).
46. Id.
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that such factors be given evidential weight, along with all other
circumstances, in the application of the statutory standard.47 The
Model Penal Code was framed on the assumption that even homi-
cide could sometimes be the product of coercion which was truly
irresistible, that danger to a loved one could have greater impact
on a man of reasonable firmness than a danger to himself, and
finally, that long and wasting pressure could break down resist-
ance more effectively than a threat of immediate destruction.4 8
V. CALIFORNIA'S Jonr LEGISLATIVE COMMrrTEE FOR REVISION OF
THE PENAL CODE
The California Legislature is not unaware of the various devel-
opments which have occurred relating to the defense of duress.
As early as 1967, the California Joint Legislative Committee for
Revision of the Penal Code proposed significant changes for Cali-
fornia's present Penal Code section 26(7).49 Section 520 of the
Legislative Committee's Tentative Draft No. 1, entitled Duress;
Compulsion, provided that a duress defense could be raised if the
defendant engaged in the conduct otherwise constituting an of-
fense because he was coerced into doing so by the threatened use
of unlawful force against his person or the person of another in
circumstances where a person of reasonable firmness would not
have done otherwise. Subsection (2) further allowed the use of
this defense where the defendant engaged in the otherwise crimi-
nal conduct in order to avoid death or great bodily harm to him-
self or another where a person of reasonable firmness would have
acted in the same manner. The restrictions which the Legislative
Committee placed upon the availability of the defense were that
it would not apply if the offense charged was murder, or when the
person claiming the defense intentionally, knowingly, or reck-
lessly, placed himself in a situation in which it was probable that
he would be subjected to duress.50 Since no mention was made of
the present case law requirement that the threatened violence be
immediate or imminent, it would appear that the committee in-
tended these requirements to remain in force. This is a slight de-
parture from the Model Penal Code, which considered threats
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. CALIFORNIA JOINT LEGISLATIVE COMMITTEE FOR REVISION OF THE PENAL
CODE §520 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1967).
50. Id., §520.3.
over a long period of time as being just as capable of breaking
down resistance as threats of immediate destruction. Perhaps the
reason for this departure was the belief that when the threats
were made over a long period of time the defendant would have
the opportunity to seek the protection of the proper authorities.
It is at once evident that the legislative committee's proposed
changes would substantially alter California's present require-
ments for the defense of duress and conform them to those of the
Model Penal Code. The major change of course, was the abolition
of California's present requirement that the defendant be
threatened with immediate death in order to invoke the defense
of duress. Under section 520 of the legislative committee's pro-
posed revision, the defendant need only show a threat of unlawful
force or of serious bodily injury to establish the defense. Another
important change was the committee's acceptance of the fact that
threats of injury to a man's wife and children, are just as coercive
as threats made only to his personal well-being.51
In drafting section 520, the legislative committee abandoned
California's present fixed standard for determining the degree of
threatened force necessary to establish duress. The committee
chose, instead, to follow the lead of the Model Penal Code, and
adopt the balancing standard for determining whether the de-
fendant's otherwise criminal conduct should be excused. Under
the committee's Tentative Draft, the relevant test would be
whether the defendant acted in a manner consistent with what a
person of reasonable firmness would have done in the same situa-
tion.5 2 This balancing standard would allow the reasonableness of
the defendant's conduct to be examined on a case-by-case basis,
whereas the present standard would preclude the defense unless
the defendant established that he was threatened with immediate
death.
The legislative committee sought to bring California's penal
prohibitions in conformity with the theory that criminal culpabil-
ity can only exist where there has been some exercise of free will.
Any higher standard would not only be unfair to the person faced
with the dilemma occasioned by threatened violence which other
reasonable and normal members of the community would not
have been able to withstand, it would be unenforceable. The com-
mittee felt that conduct, which results from a level of intimidation
high enough to affect most others in the same situation, is simply
not voluntary in any meaningful sense of the term. Thus, neither
moral nor legal responsibility should attach to such conduct.
51. Id. §520 at 42 Comment.
52. Note 48 supra.
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From these propositions it follows that whenever compulsion
overcomes the will of the actor, his conduct is involuntary and the
defense of duress may be established.5 3
Unfortunately, debating the pros and cons of the legislative
committee's Tentative Draft has become an idle gesture due to
the draft's subsequent history. The final proposal, introduced as
Senate Bill No. 27 by Senator Roberti on December 7, 1976, was
entirely devoid of the revisions proposed by Tentative Draft No.
1.54 Section 3304 of the Bill provided:
(a) In a prosecution for an offense other than murder, it is a defense that
the defendant engaged in conduct constituting the offense because of
threats or menaces sufficient to show that he had reasonable cause to and
did believe his life would be endangered if he refused.
For all practical purposes, Senate Bill No. 27 will not change
California's stringent requirement for the establishment of the
defense of duress. The fixed standard, adopted nearly a century
ago, will still be the method by which the reasonableness of the
defendant's conduct will be measured. Thus, the degree of
threatened force necessary to invoke the defense will continue to
be threats of immediate death, the trier of fact will not be permit-
ted to excuse criminal conduct occasioned by threats of serious
bodily injury, the defendant will face criminal sanctions for his
conduct, even though a man of reasonable firmness would have
acted in the same manner in the same situation 'and, finally,
threatened violence to one's wife and children will not be a viable
defense.
The Joint Legislative Committee for Revision of the Penal Code
felt that the proposed revisions of their first tentative draft were
deleted because of the reluctance on the part of the District Attor-
ney to support them.55 From the standpoint of the prosecution, it
is understandable why the revisions were not supported. Califor-
nia's present defense of duress, with its fixed criteria of
threatened harm, precludes juror consideration as to when an ac-
ceptable end may justify an otherwise offensive means. Had the
proposed revisions been enacted as law, the defendant would be
permitted to allege by way of excuse that he committed the crime
charged under fear of serious bodily injury and that he acted in
the same manner as a person of reasonable firmness would have
53. Id.
54. CAL. S.B. 27, Sess. 1977-78, §3304 (1976).
55. Telephone interview with Edward R. Cohen, Project Director, Joint Legis-
lative Committee for Revision of the Penal Code, December 9, 1977.
acted under the circumstances.5 6 It would then have been incum-
bent upon the District Attorney to disprove that the defendant ac-
ted in a reasonable manner. The added difficulty of this task may
have been in part responsible for the District Attorney's reluc-
tance to support the proposed revisions.
The District Attorney's burden would not have increased to a
measurable extent when the offense charged was murder, or
when the defendant intentionally, knowingly or recklessly placed
himself in a situation in which it was probable that he would be
subjected to duress. These factual circumstances would have pre-
cluded the availability of the defense under the proposed revi-
sions.57 The revisions might have been made more palatable to
the District Attorney by requiring that the severity of the
threatened violence exceed the gravity of the crime subsequently
committed. This would have alleviated any justifiable concerns
for the anomalous results which could occur if a defendant was
permitted to claim duress as a defense to a crime more serious
that the threatened violence sought to be avoided. By incorporat-
ing a responsibility to resist threatened violence less serious than
the gravity of the crime subsequently committed into the concept
of "a person of reasonable firmness," these results could have
been entirely obviated.
The District Attorney's reluctance to support the proposed revi-
sions is regrettable. The revisions would have brought Califor-
nia's criminal sanctions in line with the concept of moral
culpability. The revisions would also have provided a degree of
flexibility to the duress defense, making the defense more respon-
sive to the sudden and unexpected factual circumstances which
give rise to its application. A broader range of influences would
have been recognized as being capable of usurping an individual's
free will under the proposed revisions. Additionally, the determi-
nation of whether criminal conduct should be excused could be
adjudicated on a case-by-case basis, without reliance upon a fixed
standard of presumed fortitude.
VI. CONCLUSION
Whatever revisions may be necessary for California's present
defense of duress, it is not likely that the legislature will enact
these changes in the near future. However, one bright star on the
horizon offering hope that changes may be forthcoming may be a
judicial attempt to find a method for allowing consideration of
threats of serious bodily injury. Although Justice Tobriner's dis-
56. Note 48 supra.
57. Supra note 48, at subsection (3).
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cussion in the Otis decision asserting that fear of serious bodily
injury should, in some cases, excuse criminal conduct has not yet
been judicially recognized as law, the decision has been cited fa-
vorably by the judiciary on numerous occasions. In 1973, the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court in People v. Perez noted:
Although a number of cases in this state have held that the fear must lit-
erally be of death, People v. Otis ... suggests that the fine distinction be-
tween fear of danger to life and fear of great bodily harm is unrealistic.
According to Otis ... the threats must be of present, immediate harm, not
future violence.
5 8
Judging by the favorable reception given the Otis decision, the
Court appears to be in favor of relaxing California's strict require-
ments for the establishment of the duress defense. One possible
method for accomplishing this task may be for the Court to treat
the issue of duress as being relevant to the defendant's lack of
criminal intent.59 Since mens rea is an element of almost every
crime, the prosecution would be required to prove beyond a rea-
sonable doubt that a person committing a crime pursuant to
threats of violence was acting with sufficient mens rea for those
acts to constitute a crime.60 The burden should be on the prose-
cution to prove each essential element of the crime charged, in-
cluding the issue of willfulness in carrying out the criminal acts.61
As the Supreme Court of California noted in People v. Tewksbury,
Among such defensive assertions could be an accused's contention that
the crime was committed under duress or compulsion. (See §26. subd.
Eight) If in so asserting the accused contends that he is not guilty of the
crime charged because his free will was so overcome he did not act in the
exercise thereof, he necessarily attacks the prosecution's allegation that
he acted with criminal intent. (See People v. Otis [citation omitted]) As
mens rea is an element of the crime charged (§20), it must be established
58. People v. Perez, 9 Cal. 3d 651, 657, 510 P.2d 1026, 1029, 108 Cal. Rptr. 474, 478
(1973) (Citation omitted).
59. CAL. PENAL CODE §20 (West 1970). "In every crime or public offense there
must exist a union, or joint operation of act and intent, or criminal negligence."
60. J.M. Boyer, The Constitutionality of Criminal Affirmative Defenses: Duress
and Coercion, 11 U.S.F.L. REV. 123, 143 (1976-77) (Hereinafter cited as J.M. Boyer).
(C)an it be said beyond a reasonable doubt that a person under duress
does a criminal act with sufficient mens rea to constitute a crime? Placed
this way, it becomes clear that the issue of duress, for one, is really the
issue of mens rea. The existence of mens rea is an element of almost
every crime, and as an element of a crime mens rea cannot be considered
a distinct ground of defense 'not necessarily connected' with the crime
charged. It is settled by the Supreme Court of the United States that, at
least as to the actual elements of crimes, the burden of proof never shifts
to the defendant. (Citations omitted).
61. United States v. Johnson, 516 F.2d 209, 213 (8th Cir. 1975); cert. denied 96 S.
Ct. 112 (1975).
beyond a reasonable doubt if the accused is to be convicted: hence he
need only raise a reasonable doubt that he acted in the exercise of his free
wiU.62
Penal Code section 26 (7) provides as a matter of law that a per-
son is not capable of committing a crime if he acts under fear that
his life is in danger and if certain other requirements have been
satisfied.63 Once the various requirements for the defense of du-
ress have been met, a defendant cannot be convicted of crimes
(except those punishable by death) which were committed pursu-
ant to the threat of death because the defendant is presumed to
have been acting without the exercise of free will. It would not
appear to be incongruous to also allow the defendant the ability
to raise a reasonable doubt as to the existence of criminal intent
when the defendant has been threatened with harm less serious
than death. If the defendant can establish the requisite showing
that his life was endangered, then, as a matter of law, he would be
deemed to be incapable of committing a crime. However, if a de-
fendant merely established that he was put in fear of serious bod-
ily injury, it would then be up to the trier of fact to determine
whether the threats were sufficient to overcome the defendant's
free will and hence negate the element of criminal intent.
Whether the trier of fact will be permitted to consider threats of
harm less serious than death as sufficient to overcome an individ-
ual's free will remains a matter of speculation. It does not, how-
ever, appear to be within the authority of the legislature to dictate
what facts will be sufficient to constitute a reasonable doubt in
the mind of the trier of fact.64 A reading of the Tewksbury case
reveals the idea that threats of serious bodily injury may also be
capable of negating criminal intent, since such threats can also
overcome an individual's exercise of free will. If so, a defendant
who has committed a crime pursuant to threats of serious bodily
injury should seek to introduce these threats in order to disprove
criminal intent, rather than to establish the statutory defense of
duress which would require a threat of immediate death. A de-
fendant should only be required to carry the lesser burden of ad-
ducing some initial evidence of duress. Thereafter, the
prosecution should be required to disprove duress beyond a rea-
sonable doubt. The defendant's testimony should be sufficient to
raise the defense theory and to allow a determination by the trier
62. People v. Tewksbury, 15 Cal. 3d 953, 964 n.9, 544 P.2d 1335, 1343 n.9, 127 Cal.
Rptr. 135, 143 n.9 (1976).
63. CAL PENAL CODE §26 (7), supra note 18.
64. Morrison v. California, 291 U.S. 82, 90 (1933). "It is not within the provi-
dence of a Legislature to declare an individual guilty or presumptively guilty of a
crime."
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